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PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND
A SPECIAL BOOK REVIEW
GEORGE G. BOGERT

delivered a series of five lectures under
the Thomas M. Cooley lectureship in February, 1955, at the
University of Michigan. These lectures comprise a volume of
considerable interest which is the subject of this review.* The basic
problems discussed are the extent to which existing legal rules limit
the power of a property owner to control by conveyance during
his life or at his death the ownership and use of the property which he
has at his disposal; what are the objectives of these rules; and to what
extent should they be modified or abolished in the light of their present-day operation and of sound public policy.
The qualifications of Professor Simes in this field are so impressive
and well known as to need no elaboration, consisting as they do of his
introductory training in property law under the guidance of a master,
the late Harry A. Bigelow; his thirty-seven years of experience in
teaching the law of property and fiduciary administration; and the
publication of several standard works covering these topics, including
his authoritative treatise on Future Interests. When he summarizes
views and observations which are the fruit of this extensive and intensive study the profession may well listen attentively.
Before proceeding to discuss briefly the content of these lectures
the reviewer desires to pay tribute to the manner and method in which
they are presented. The language is clear and direct. The sentences
are short and the terminology simple and easily understood. Involved
structure and abstruse phrases are avoided. Common sense and moderation are everywhere evident. In short Professor Simes has given us a
readable and interesting discussion of a subject which is often treated
with mystery and confusion.
ROFESSOR LEWIS M. SIMES

* Public Policy and the Dead Hand. By Lewis M. Simes. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The
University of Michigan, 1955. Pp. xxii, 163.
MR. BOGERT is Professor of Law at Hastings College of Law, San Francisco.A former
Dean of the Cornell University Law School and Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Chicago, he drafted several uniform acts for the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, including the Uniform Common Trust Fund Act. He is
author of several treatises on the law of Trust..
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I

The author's first lecture, "Should the Dead Hand Distribute: Free
Will vs. Family," considers the extent to which a testator should be
allowed to exclude members of his family from the enjoyment of his
property after his death. Here are considered dower and curtesy, the
family allowance and homestead rights, the power of a spouse to elect
to take a statutory share in lieu of a provision made by will, the rights
of spouses under community property laws, and illusory inter vivos
trusts which are in substance wills and are intended to evade the statutes giving a surviving spouse a certain share of the estate. These all
involve, of course, considerable restrictions on the power of a property owner to distribute his property at death and hence are cases
where the legislatures have decided that in some ways the dead hand
shall not control.
Professor Simes asserts as a fundamental proposition that, "complete
freedom of testation should be permitted except to the extent that
there is some public policy against it." He feels that the ethical claim
of a surviving spouse justifies restriction on the power of the deceased
spouse to give away his property at his death and validates the claim
of the survivor to a fixed share; but with reference to the children of
the testator Simes contends that American testators usually treat children with fairness and do not disinherit them without reason, and
hence that a child should be permitted to take against the will "only
to the extent that the child is unable to provide for his own maintenance and education, and only in the amount necessary for this purpose." As to inter vivos dispositions and the exclusion of the surviving
spouse Simes would follow the model of the Federal Estate Tax Law
and by statute select certain described inter vivos transactions as
equivalent to wills for family restriction purposes.
The rights of members of the family to take against a gift to charity

are treated in a later lecture.
If one were to venture a suggestion with regard to this lecture, it
would be that consideration be given to requiring by statute that at
least in some instances surviving dependent parents should be entitled
to a share of their child's estate.
II
In his second lecture, "The Rule against Perpetuities: Dead Hand
vs. Alienability," the author examines the claim thit the rule is neces-
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sary in order to make property interests alienable, to keep the channels
of exchange open, to promote sales and investments, and to keep
capital productive.
Admitting that the common law has a strong bias in favor of alienability, that it strikes down attempts to restrain it, and that in the case
of legal interests the Rule may have some effect in insuring marketability, Simes considers whether it has much bearing on the types of
future interests now customarily created.
He asserts, and it would seem with reason, that most contingent
interests are now equitable, that is, the interests of trust beneficiaries,
and furthermore that in most well-drawn trust instruments the trustee
is given a power of sale of the trust property. A string of legal interests in real or personal property, some of which are contingent, is
probably very rare. Problems of management and the protection of
the successive owners make the trust form imperative.
Thus, Simes argues, if a trust is created to last for a period longer
than that of the Rule, as far as ownership and use of the things which
are the subject of the trust is concerned, there is freedom of transfer
by means of the use of the power of sale, and the trustee has power to
extinguish the equitable interests of the cestuis in these things and to
give a perfect title. The fact that the right of the cestuis to have the
trust enforced, and the consequent equitable title to the trust res from
time to time, may be inalienable by the cestuis, either because of the
contingent nature of the cestuis' interests or because those interests are
affected by a spendthrift clause, is not of any moment from the public
point of view. The stocks, bonds, mortgages, land, and other things
pass freely into the flow of commerce.
As buttressing this argument as to the relative unimportance of the
Rule nowadays Simes cites the English Property Act of 1925 which
puts property under a trust with a power of sale in the trustee, the
power of American courts to order a sale of future interests in land
and a reinvestment of the proceeds which would cut off contingent
interests, and the recent English statutory tendency to allow the condemnation of land (including contingent interests) where the property is unproductive as it stands but can through condemnation be put
to some good use.
Thus, from the point of view of promoting alienability of property, this seems to leave need for the rule only in the relatively small
percentage of deeds and wills where legal contingent interests are
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created or where there are contingent interests under a trust which
gives the trustee no power of sale. Even in this latter case, however,
the need for the Rule may be said to be reduced by the power of
equity to order a sale of the trust property where it is desirable.
III
In his third lecture Professor Simes considers the justifications for
the Rule which can be advanced, aside from obstruction of alienation.
As to the argument that the Rule prevents the undue concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, he agrees with Professor Leach
that income and 'estate taxes effectively prevent this evil, and so the
Rule is not needed for that purpose.
Simes rejects the suggestion that the Rule is useful in bringing into
play the doctrine that the fittest should survive and that socially undesirable weaklings should not be protected. The Rule permits one
generation of weaklings to be protected, and the policy of present-day
society is to care for the weak and let the fit look out for their own
welfare.
The lecturer finds grounds for the continuance of the Rule in that
it strikes a fair balance between unrestricted testamentary disposition
by the present generation and unrestrained control by future generations. He apparently considers it a compromise of the contesting
claims of these two interests.
Mr. Simes also asserts that the Rule is needed to insure that the
living shall from time to time be able to decide how existing property
shall be enjoyed, a result he deems in accord with public policy.
Where there are contingent interests in the cestuis of a trust, the
power of sale of the trustee does not, he argues, give complete freedom of use of the trust res, since risk investments of trust funds would
not normally be legal and since trust property can be used for capital
investment only and not for the purchase of consumer goods. Hence,
unless the Rule puts some control on the length of the contingency
of equitable interests, the social usefulness of the trust property will
be restricted.
Simes also comments that future interests under trusts may be handicapped by conditions which control the conduct of the donee, and
gifts over in cases of breach of these conditions. The Rule is needed
to abbreviate the time during which these conditions may endure,
even though the trustee has a power of sale.
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He then discusses several criticisms of various features of the Rule,
as it has been construed by the courts, on the assumption that if the
Rule is to be retained, some of its provisions should be amended. First,
the Rule deals with possibilities, however remote. The gift must
stand up under all conceivable conditions. Secondly, the validity of a
contingent interest is determined under the Rule as of the date of its
creation and not by events which have transpired later. It is immaterial that at the time of litigation all chance of a remote vesting of a
contingent interest has been removed. Thirdly, remoteness of vesting
results in the total invalidity of the interest, rather than in its partial
destruction or acceleration of vesting. (It might have been added that
the invalid interest often drags down with it preceding interests which
are perfectly good.) Fourth, it is said that the Rule should apply to
interests which will take effect in possession (although not in interest)
at remote dates, since from a practical point of view they obstruct
alienation. Fifth, there is criticism of the period-lives in being and
twenty-one years. Sixth, it is sometimes urged that the Rule should
be applied to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, but is not.
The lecturer next examines proposed changes with reference to the
Rule. He is opposed to complete abolition and the substitution of another rule, on the ground that attempts of this type in New York and
elsewhere have been unsuccessful and have caused much litigation.
He does not favor the "wait and see" doctrine by which the validity
of contingent interests is to await the outcome of events and decision
be reserved until it can be learned whether contingent interests actually do become vested at a remote date, since this often involves undesirable uncertainty in property ownership for a protracted period.
Simes would give the courts power to construe the disposition in
such a way as to avoid violation of the Rule and to accomplish the result intended by the donor as nearly as possible. In addition he would
allow the application by the courts of the cy pres principle so that
where vesting was to occur at the end of a period of years greater than
twenty-one, it would be accelerated to occur at the end of twentyone years. He would also adopt a rule of construction that gifts to
occur on the happening of some event like the probate of a will should
be deemed to be subject to the condition that the probate be within
twenty-one years, and in the case of vesting at the death of the widow
of a named person there should be an implied condition that such
widow be a person in being at the time of the conveyance.
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Simes would not give blanket cy pres powers to courts administering the Rule. He would in substance bring possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry under it by limiting their duration. He is also inclined
to believe that the Rule should require interests to vest in possession
as well as in interest within the period of the Rule, which would be a
considerable extension of it.
The reviewer offers the following comments on the second and
third lectures and the Rule:
A large percentage of the bar is ignorant or poorly informed about
the Rule. The course in Future Interests is generally regarded by law
students as extremely difficult, is usually elective, and a great many
students do not take it.
This inadequacy of understanding of the Rule is reflected in the
draftsmanship of wills and deeds. The pitfalls and traps are not foreseen. There is no intent by draftsmen or testators to violate the Rule.
There is a large amount of wastage of estates in litigation over perpetuity problems arising out of construction of instruments or application of the law.
Many gifts are stricken down and the property given to relatives
who were never intended to benefit, when the donor actually never
intended to violate the Rule, or if his attention had been called to the
problem would have reworded his gift so as to avoid violation.
The amount of public benefit from the application of the Rule is
small, and is more than offset by the disadvantages named above.
The situation can be greatly improved by the adoption of relatively
simple legislation, some of which has been suggested by Mr. Simes in
his lectures and by Mr. Leach as a basis for the statutes recently
adopted in New England and Pennsylvania. The three principal ideas
which appeal to the reviewer as desirable amendments to the Rule are
(1) a statutory rule of construction creating a presumption of lack
of intent to violate the Rule; (2) the cy pres doctrine; and (3) the
"wait and see" rule.
Under the rule of construction it would be provided that if a donor
did not expressly state that the vesting was to occur after the lives
of unborn persons or after a period exceeding twenty-one years, it
should be presumed that he intended the period to be limited to lives
in being in the one case or to twenty-one years in the other instance.
It is believed that such a presumption would be realistic, that is, would
conform to the donor's actual state of mind or to the results he would
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have intended if he had appreciated the situation. Instead of taking
the most pessimistic view of the construction problems, as the courts
do at the present time, the most optimistic attitude would be taken.
Instead of searching for remote possibilities which would give ground
for invalidating the gift, the courts would be bound to assume that
the transferor intended his gift to take effect and to comply with the
law.
The cy pres doctrine (already applied in the analogous field of
accumulations) would require the courts to lop off excessive portions
of a period of contingency, where they were expressly provided for,
instead of invalidating the whole gift. Thus, a contingency of thirty
years would be reduced to twenty-one; and a delay in vesting for lives
in being and others not in being would be permitted to operate during
the period of the lives in being only.
Finally, the "wait and see" rule, recently adopted in Pennsylvania
and three New England states, seems to the reviewer very sensible
and not to be attended with great inconveniences. True during the
period of waiting there will be uncertainty whether the future interest will be good and so whether one person or another will be the
owner, but nearly all of these cases involve trusts where the trustee's
power of sale nullifies any social disadvantage as to inalienability, and
the trustee's uncertainty concerning the person to whom he is-to pay
or deliver will be resolved when it comes time for the trustee to act.
While lawyers and judges apparently have a respect for the Rule
amounting almost to veneration, recent experience would seem to
show that an organized movement for the modification of the Rule
along the lines suggested would have a good chance of success, especially if backed by title companies and corporate trustees. Indiana,
California and Michigan have recently overhauled their future interest law, and Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut have
adopted the "wait and see" principle.

IV
Professor Simes' fourth lecture, "Should the Dead Hand Increase
Its Grasp: The Policy against Accumulations," gives the history of
the rules regarding accumulations in England and the United States,
beginning with Thellusson's Case and Thellusson's Act, outlines the
common law and statutory development of the subject in this country, and expresses the view that accumulations are limited to the period
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of the Rule against Perpetuities in the case of private trusts, and to a
reasonable period to be approved by the courts in charitable trusts.
The lecturer next considers the public policy relating to accumulations, mentioning three possible arguments in favor of some limitations, namely, (1) accumulations take property out of commerce
(render it inalienable); (2) they encourage undesirable concentrations of wealth in one family or group; (3) they postpone the enjoyment of income from the present to future generations.
Simes denies that the income is kept out of commerce, since it will
not be set aside as money but will be invested by the trustee in things
which will be usually freely transferable through the trustee's power
of sale. He discounts the dangers of concentration, alleging that the
growth of funds through accumulations is smaller and slower than
generally supposed, because much of the gain is drained off by income
taxation, mismanagement or misfortune, or business depressions. He
believes that the policy against permitting the former owner to control the use of the income of property by the future owners thereof
is a valid argument for control. He feels that the rules are framed to
strike a balance between some control in the donor who made the
fortune and some power in the donee to decide how current income
is to be used.
As a result of this consideration Simes favors neither lengthening
the period of permitted accumulations beyond lives in being and
twenty-one years, nor shortening the period, as, for example, to a
two-life period or to the minority of a beneficiary. The New York
legislation, followed in some other states, limiting accumulations to
minorities only is said to have been productive of much litigation and
to be too short to enable donors to accomplish legitimate objectives.
As examples of litigation provoked by this type of statute Simes cites
the cases concerned with the question whether an accumulation is involved in the case of stock dividends, paying off encumbrances, paying insurance premiums, or providing for apportionment between
successive tenants. Parenthetically it may be suggested by the reviewer that these problems may arise under any system of accumulation law and do not constitute an argument for one plan or the
other, but rather are grounds for legislation giving a clearer meaning
to the word "accumulation."
Simes expresses the opinion that the common law rule against accumulations is rarely needed, because a provision for a very long accu-
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mulation is likely to involve remote gifts of the accumulations which
will be void under the Rule against Perpetuities, and also because
many trusts to accumulate will be terminable at the will of the cestui
where the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin is not applied. All in all the
lecturer favors the continuance of the common law rule, and would
tie accumulations and perpetuities as closely together as possible.
With respect to accumulation questions the reviewer makes two
suggestions. While there is some authority to the effect that accumulations are limited in the case of private trusts by a common law rule
to lives in being and twenty-one years, the slightness of the basis for
this rule might well be justification for the enactment of a statute
making it clear what the limits are, as has recently been done in an
amendment of the California Civil Code; and in such an act it could
be made clear that only mandatory accumulations are controlled and
exactly what is meant by an accumulation.
Secondly, would it not be desirable to permit a settlor to direct
accumulations for charity for a fixed period, say, fifty years, and for
such other period beyond the fifty-year term as the court might approve as reasonable? As the law stands now in most states trustees for
charity must go to court to secure court approval of every accumulation before they can safely act. Fifty years would generally be held
a reasonable period by the courts under the present system. Under
the proposed change if the Attorney General was convinced that the
fifty-year accumulation provision of the settlor was undesirable, it
would seem clear that on his application the court would exercise its
overriding power to eliminate undesirable administrative provisions,
but the trustee would be protected in acting under the accumulation
clause until the decree of the court modified it.
V
In his fifth and last lecture Professor Simes considers the law regarding the freedom of a donor to frame a charitable trust to suit his
own desires and views as to social interest.
First, there are rather important controls in some states preventing
testators from giving to charity by wills executed shortly before
death and from giving more than a certain fraction of the estate to
charity when close relatives survive, and in some states charitable
corporations are limited as to the amount of property they may take.
Next, Simes discusses the special privileges accorded by the law to
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the creator of a charitable trust in that he is not required to name
definite beneficiaries, may make his trust perpetual or of indefinite
duration, may provide for a gift over from one charity to another
at a remote date, and is less limited as to accumulations than in the
case of private trusts.
In considering whether the rule permitting perpetual charitable
trusts is defensible Simes argues that there is little objection to such
trusts on the ground of removal of property from commerce, since
complete ownership of the trust property is usually freely transferable by the trustee, although this power does not extend to using the
capital for risk ventures.
Perpetual charitable trusts do prevent the current generation from
deciding what shall be done with trust capital and income. That has
been decided by the settlor, subject to the use of the cy pres power
in cases of impossibility or illegality. The problem is in essence
whether the disadvantages of dead hand control outweigh the social
gains coming from the administration of the trust.
Simes considers whether it is possible to define charity more clearly,
or to classify charities into those of major and minor importance, and
inclines toward negative answers. While perpetual charitable trusts
possess a defect in that they may become obsolete, due to social and
economic changes, this objection is to some extent removed by the
power of the court to use cy pres and to remould the trust to meet
the changed conditions. However, the doctrine has been applied with
varying degrees of liberality, ranging from a requirement of strict
impossibility to lesser degrees of difficulty. By a description of the
history of the Mullanphy trust in St. Louis and the Benjamin Franklin trusts in Boston and Philadelphia Simes illustrates the delay, expense, and unsatisfactory results of the use of cy pres.
Professor Simes is opposed to narrowing the definition of charity
or to making a flat limitation on the life of all charitable trusts. He
cites the Sailors' Snug Harbor trust, set up in 1801, as an ancient trust
which is still operating satisfactorily and doing much good. He favors
some relief from the disadvantages of perpetual charitable trusts by
enlargement of the cy pres power, making it usable by the courts,
with the consent of the trustees and the donor (if living) after a
period of thirty years, not only in cases of impossibility or impracticality but also inexpediency; and he would give charitable trustees
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power to use trust capital after the lapse of a fixed period since the
trust began (say thirty years).
The reviewer agrees that the cy pres rule should be to some degree
relaxed. It is believed that a proper balance between respect for the
wishes of the deceased donor and the anxiety of his successors to see
his desires carried out on the one hand, and the interests of the public
for whom all charitable trusts are created on the other hand, could
be maintained if "impracticality" and "inexpediency" were added to
the list of emergencies justifying a change in the trust. The latter
types of application might be granted only after a sufficient period
had elapsed so that the feelings of members of the donor's immediate
family would not be disturbed by the change. Possibly one generation, or thirty years, would be sufficient. After that it seems unjustified to require the trustees to make a wasteful and unwise use of the
funds. The actual expansion of the cy pres power in Scotland and the
proposed enlargement of it advocated in the recent Nathan report in
England seem to represent desirable trends.
To avoid the waste and delay which Simes shows so clearly have
occurred in certain famous American cases of obsolescent charities it
would be well for settlors to consider granting the cy pres power to
their trustees, as has been done with such good effect in the case of
community trusts.
Lastly, it is urged by the reviewer that other states follow the lead
of Pennsylvania in abolishing the distinction between a broad and
narrow charitable intent in the law of cy pres. The cases apply the
rule only where it is found that the donor had a general or broad
charitable intent, as distinguished from a purpose to benefit a limited
and particular charitable object. It is submitted that the cy pres doctrine should be applied in all cases of the failure of the charity, unless
the settlor clearly directs otherwise. Drawing the line between a
broad intent and a narrow intent is extremely difficult, frequently
there is very little reason for deciding which was in the testator's
mind a good deal of fiction and artificiality is displayed in the opinions, and the decisions are often conflicting and of dubious soundness.

